Why the Populist Right Is Not Always Anti-Climate

My argument in this post is that this assumption is no longer sufficient. By expecting populists on the right to be anti-science and anti-climate as a matter of definition, the ideational approach obscures what is actually happening within climate politics. It also risks leaving those who want to advance climate action on the back foot, since it makes it harder to recognise and respond to more flexible and adaptive forms of climate populism.

Much of the academic and public debate continues to treat climate populism as something found almost exclusively among the exclusionary right, where elites are accused of using climate policy against ordinary people. Climate denialism certainly remains a force, as shown by Donald Trump withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement and dismissing climate change as a 'con job'. Yet equating populism with outright denialism misses important developments.

Over the past few decades, many right-wing parties in Europe and beyond have softened their stance on climate change, moving away from outright rejection of the science. Instead, they now tend to accept that climate change is real while objecting to specific policy measures. These objections focus on sovereignty, fairness, and the perceived economic burden on workers and households. This shift has allowed the populist right to reframe environmentalism in national terms and to present themselves as the true defenders of ordinary people against distant experts and unaccountable international bodies. Even self-described sceptics often support policies such as renewable energy expansion or pollution reduction. Treating them as a uniform bloc of denialists only strengthens their narrative that climate politics ignores legitimate concerns.

At the same time, climate change itself has become entangled with broader narratives about immigration, overpopulation, nature, and national decline. Genuine concerns about the distributional effects of net zero policies can be woven into exclusionary frames. The Yellow Vests movement in France illustrates this well. Real anxieties about how a carbon tax would affect working households became part of a wider story that portrayed climate measures as the work of a remote elite more concerned with international prestige than with everyday life. Climate politics here becomes a vehicle for grievances that are not inherently environmental but are easily folded into populist claims about neglect, inequality, and unfairness.

The simplistic picture is further complicated by the case of Boris Johnson, as I have suggested recently. Despite previously mocking green policy, Johnson placed climate action at the centre of his political programme, championed net zero, invoked a green industrial revolution, and pursued active climate diplomacy in the run-up to COP26. Rather than rejecting expertise or international cooperation, he embraced both, framing climate mitigation as a source of national pride, industrial renewal, and global leadership. From within the ideational approach, this seems inconsistent or opportunistic. Yet this interpretation overlooks the way Johnson rearticulated climate action through a nationalist-populist narrative. Climate policy became a way to position Britain as a global leader once again, to restore industrial confidence, and to strengthen the story of a unified national people with a renewed sense of purpose.

Johnson's example reveals the limits of the ideational model's rigidity. If populism is defined as inherently anti-science and anti-climate, then cases like this can only be dismissed as deception or contradiction. A more convincing explanation comes from the discursive approach, which treats populism as a flexible political style rather than a fixed worldview. From this perspective, populism can incorporate climate action as long as it is framed in a way that resonates with national belonging, popular sovereignty, or economic revival.

Recognising this matters. The assumption that populism and climate action are natural enemies is now under significant pressure. If climate politics can be reshaped by populist narratives rather than rejected outright, then campaigns for ambitious climate policy must be prepared for new forms of contestation and co-option. In my own work, I adopt the discursive approach because it helps us see populism as something that continually shifts and adapts, drawing new groups and new issues into its construction of the people. This provides a clearer and more realistic lens through which to understand the changing landscape of climate politics, and it helps avoid the trap of underestimating the populist right's ability to shape environmental debates.

You can read more about the study that inspired this post here: Climate Populism and the Limits of the Ideational Approach.