Dr Stephen Wood

Corporate governance broadly refers to the mechanisms, relations, and processes by which a corporation is controlled and is directed; involves balancing the many interests of a corporation’s stakeholders. Since the financial crisis of 2008, much of the literature dealing with corporate governance has focused on the financial welfare of its stakeholders. However, following 9/11, civil aviation corporations have also had to take account of the physical welfare of their stakeholders when assessing the risks of terrorist attacks. After the recent attacks at Brussels and Istanbul airports there is little evidence that significant changes have occurred to secure safety in the public areas of airports in the UK, known as ‘landside,’ leading to the check in gates. This raises the question of whether, should the risk of terrorism attacks materialise and lead to the death of victims, there can be criminal liability on the part of airport operators.

Since the EU introduced Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 to support access and reduce barriers for People with Disabilities (PwD). Member States of the EU, and their respective Departments of Transport, have had the responsibility to ensure the Regulation is adopted, complied with, and evidenced at airports. This paper assesses to what extent the aviation sector in the EU, particularly the UK, is carrying out its legal obligations and whether a new ethos towards disabled travellers has been created because of regulations both at EU and national level since 2006. The conclusion drawn from legislation, the courts, and changes to airport infrastructure, show that whilst improvements have been made to enable access and reduce barriers for PwD, it will take a number of years and a greater desire from the sector to ensure equality for disabled passengers.

9/11 created a new paradigm of international terrorism that consequently required a new global risk assessment of terrorism. 9/11 transformed airport security checks for citizens internationally and, for some minorities, these checks have had an impact on their experience of the security process. The West responded to 9/11 at home by creating national legislation to counter terrorism. The UK initially focused on trying to deport suspicious foreign nationals who had the slightest involvement with terrorism, but following 7/7 the government’s focus was to counter terrorism nationally amongst British Muslims extremists consequently impacting at times disproportionately on local Muslim communities.  This research is concerned with the effects of security changes since 9/11 at UK airports on the young passenger experience. Airport security is twofold, when embarking on a journey; the first phase is the electronic screening of passengers by airport security. The second is the potential of passengers being stopped and screened by the police. When disembarking, passengers are subject to immigration checks and possible police checks. In both cases of the police checks, Schedule 7 is the legal means to determine whether the passenger is a terrorist.  University students aged 16-25 were surveyed to obtain data. A number of university students have either carried out terrorist attacks or supported such causes and most terrorists since 9/11 have been aged 16-35. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) now imposes duties on universities to prevent radicalisation; it also strengthens security arrangements in relation to the border and to aviation.  There are three hypotheses in this research that will test the research questions. The first is whether it takes younger respondents longer to travel through security, and if so why. The second hypothesis asks whether in the opinion of these respondents all passengers are treated the same or should be. Finally, whether passengers agree to the high level of security at UK airports. The findings of these hypotheses will show that first, young respondents in this research did take longer to go through airport security and the reasons why will be explained. Second, that whilst there is overwhelming support for airport security, there is a significant difference in how the white and non-white respondents in this research perceive airport security and how some aspects of security, such as confiscation of liquids, are unpopular and contribute to delays.

In 2017 an application to de-proscribe The Red Hand Commando (RHC) loyalist paramilitary organisation was submitted by an organisation known as the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC) which has the backing of other proscribed loyalist groups including the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and RHC. The application was understandably considered negatively by some relatives of RHC victims as well as by Sinn Féin. The application was rejected for failing to comply with the necessary process of de-proscription which reinforces the criticism and difficulty for proscribed organisations that are no longer engaged in terrorism to de-proscribe. If the Northern Ireland Assembly and Commissions set up in Northern Ireland (NI) following the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) with support from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) are to dismantle paramilitary groups, then they must take bold decisions and decide whether it is time to support the de-proscription of paramilitary groups that have relinquished political violence. This article recommends that agencies should set out a staged process which can be followed by proscribed organisations in NI interested in applying for de-proscription thereby enabling them to self-evaluate whether or not they are ready for de-proscription.

Security at airports throughout the world has significantly changed since the 9/11 attacks. As a result of those changes, a minority of passengers have claimed that their human rights have been infringed from discriminatory security measures. Muslim passengers have raised the greatest concerns suggesting their community is both stigmatised, and stereo typed as bearing responsibility for recent terrorist events and as potential terrorist threats. According to many in that community this has resulted in overzealous security checks and inappropriate security questioning. Some might suggest that young Muslims passengers should expect to be checked and questioned more frequently if they are travelling near conflict zones or have shown sympathy towards terrorist groups in the past. This paper questions whether there can be a situation, regardless of human rights, in which a community might be expected to be questioned more than another community provided such an action benefits most of both communities regardless of race. This is known as the principal of utilitarianism, in which the actions of the state are based on benefiting most of its citizens, acknowledging that by doing so this may affect a small portion of them. The state, particularly in the UK, has continuously enacted legislation to try and prevent terrorist attacks at the expense often of individual human rights. Some might say the police need the right tools to attack the emerging and continuously changing threat of terrorism. However. If the doctrine of utility is adopted at the expense of the minority then it questions whether the state is abandoning the rule of law.

Arguably, one of the biggest threats faced by Western nations in the twenty first century is that of terrorism. In 2017, the UK witnessed 36 deaths from several attacks showing the acute problem and challenges the UK faces. Since 2014, just over 1000 UK citizens have travelled to Syria to join Isis, exemplifying the growing concern for the UK. The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) was introduced to stem and prevent new recruits for terrorist organisations such as Isis. CTSA Part 5 Ch1 s.26 placed Prevent, a counter-terrorism strand from its broader strategy CONTEST on a statutory footing in an attempt to focus the attention of public authorities to reduce the threat of terrorism through “Channel” a de-radicalisation programme. To date, the Prevent strategy appears to have had little impact in stemming the tide of willing individuals who are prepared to carry out terror-related acts. The strategy has galvanised criticism from the public sector who are subject to it. It has polarised relationships between the police, government and the Muslim community, ultimately weakening the UK’s ability to deal with radicalised individuals. Fischbacher-Smith suggested that “wicked problems can’t be solved, but they can be tamed”. This article investigates how far the UK has progressed in stemming the tide of individuals being radicalised and drawn into terrorism since the introduction of the CTSA and whether there has been sufficient “buy in” of Prevent.

The UK terrorist attack and the killing of Sir David Amess MP in October 2021 was an echo and repeat of the Jo Cox killing five years earlier, in June 2016. A reminder that in a liberal democracy where the terrorist threat is often described as substantial or severe, State actors, such as Members of Parliament, as well as other dignitaries, remain vulnerable to attack, particularly MPs in their own constituencies. The counter-terrorism policy “Prevent” is ineffective in cases where individuals are determined to carry out such attacks. This article will critically evaluate the capability of the Prevent strategy to block attacks against the State, such as those described, and shows Prevent plays a more limited role in trying to reach individuals before they become radicalised.

The focus of this paper is to share research carried out over a four year period to assess passengers experience and opinions of security measures’ Airside’ at UK airports introduced as a result of terrorism since 9/11. The respondent profile was university students, 93% of whom were aged between 18-25. A survey was carried out between 2011 and 2014 at Leeds Beckett University of 711 respondents who have had 3867 security experiences, both leaving and returning to UK airports. All major UK airports were included in the survey. The data suggests younger passengers do take longer to pass through security and there are significant differences of opinion between whites and non-white on who should be profiled for security screening.

Discusses the adequacy and proportionality of counter-terrorist legislation, programmes and initiatives developed since the Terrorism Act 2000 in response to the changing nature of terrorist threats, focusing on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

Prevent remains a controversial counter terrorism strategy which is viewed with suspicion within the Muslim community, despite the growth of far-right referrals over recent years. The strategy still refers more Muslims than any other ethnicity, consequently it is regarded by some as discriminatory and as a tool to spy on their community rather than to counter terrorism but is this really a fair assessment of a strategy? This article will explore the strategy through its marginal approach of exclusively focusing on young Muslim people, their communities and their educational institutions. It will consider whether the Prevent strategy diverts from its aim to deter vulnerable people from being drawn towards terroristrelated activity but instead alienates the Muslim community and stifles free speech indirectly through State surveillance.

Today, airports have a rigorous security focus on operational consistency from legislative and policy mandates being a priority rather than allowing airport operators satisfactory autonomy to adapt policy to their requirements (Poole 2009). Poole and Passantino (2003) stated that there is a tendency to try to treat all passengers the same, which can mean resources are not allocated to areas of greater risk. Resources are diverted to better technology and reducing staffing to process large numbers of passengers. Despite technological changes there are concerns security at airports can often focus on ethnic minority passengers

Policing airports following 9/11 has been challenging with an emphasis on visibility and high levels of security checks for passengers. The focus has been on a form of ‘reassurance policing’ and an emphasis on procedural justice which is accepted as legitimate on the part of the public. However, there have been claims that that Muslim passengers are under greater suspicion than other passengers and have been subject to the practice of ‘racial profiling’. The powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, notably Schedule 7 have been under scrutiny as to the extent that they allow the police to stop and search suspects. This study reviews the opinions and experiences of young passengers at UK airports to see if they are reassured by policing and their opinions on profiling fellow passengers.